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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FREDERICK R. HARDY and 
ERIK H. MADSEN, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No, 
14418 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
* * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Under date of November 19, 1974, the State Tax Commis-
sion of Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "Tax Commission" or 
the "Commission", through its Auditing Division, proposed separ-
ate deficiency assessments (Ex. 1 and Ex. 2) against Dr. Frederick 
R. Hardy and Dr. Erik H. Madsen in the amounts of $55.34 and $145.2 9 
respectively. Plaintiffs are both licensed to practice dentistry 
within the State of Utah and are conducting the practice of dentis-
try as that term is defined by Section 58-7-6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. At all times pertinent hereto, Dr. Frederick R. Hardy was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Secretary of the Utah Dental Association and in such capacity was 
requested by said Association to obtain a judicial declaration of 
the propriety of certain sales and use taxes included within said 
audit deficiencies. Both plaintiffs paid the deficiencies as as-
sessed. 
The matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
Commission on July 10, 1975. At that time two Stipulations of Fact 
were entered into (R. 15, 85). Therein it was stipulated that the 
principal contested issues of law were and are: 
1. Whether or not the transactions upon which the de-
ficiency assessments herein have been levied constitute sales at 
retail of tangible personal property, or services for repairs, 
renovations, cleaning or washing of tangible personal property 
to an ultimate user or consumer (R. 17, 89). 
2. Whether or not plaintiffs are ultimate users or con-
sumers as such terms are defined by Utah law (R. 17, 89). 
3. Whether amounts charged by plaintiffs to their pa-
tients constitute charges for tangible personal property trans-
ferred or rather represent charges for skill, knowledge and per-
sonal services furnished incident to the practice of dentistry 
(R. 18). 
4. Whether or not the Utah statutes upon which the 
deficiency assessments herein are based are void for indefinite-
ness or are unconstitutional (R. 18, 89). 
5. Whether or not the deficiency assessments levied 
against the transactions herein are predicated upon the exercise 
2 
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of legislative authority beyond the authority granted to the Tax 
Commission by statute (R. 18, 89). 
6. Whether or not it is unconstitutional to tax plain-
tiffs for services rendered incident to filling prescriptions for 
the use and benefit of their patients when such services are con-
tracted with a dental laboratory and to exempt the same services 
for the use and benefit of plaintiffs1 patients when the plain-
tiffs perform said services themselves (R. 18, 89). 
7. Whether the charges to plaintiffs1 patients incident 
to receiving the personal services of plaintiffs are for personal 
services rendered incident to the practice of dentistry or whether 
said charges represent the sale of tangible personal property not 
incidental to the rendition of professional services (R. 89). 
8. Whether sales tax regulation S-70 applies to the 
plaintiffs (R. 18, 90). 
9. Whether or not plaintiffs are required under Utah 
law to apply for and maintain a valid sales and use tax license 
(R. 89). 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION 
As a result of the aforesaid hearing, the Tax Commission 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decision on Decem-
ber 12, 1975, (R. 76-82) wherein the original deficiency assessments 
as proposed by its Auditing Division were sustained. The Decision, 
3 . ; 
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Findings and Conclusions of the Commission only responded to issues 
Nos. 2 and 8 set forth in plaintiffs1 Statement of the Case. 
The Decision of the Commission specifically did not de-
termine; 
1. Whether the transactions included within the defi-
ciency assessments herein constitute sales at retail; 
2. Whether amounts charged by plaintiffs to their pa-
tients constitute charges for tangible personal property, or rather 
only represent charges for personal services; 
3. Whether or not the Utah statutes are void or uncon-
stitutional; 
4. Whether the deficiency assessments are predicated 
upon an exercise of legislative authority beyond that granted to 
the Commission by the Utah Legislature; 
5. Whether or not it is unconstitutional to tax the 
plaintiffs for services rendered incident to filling prescriptions 
for their patients when such services are contracted with a dental 
laboratory and to exempt the same services when furnished by the 
plaintiffs themselves; (R.76-82) 
6. The Decision further failed to determine whether or 
not the plaintiffs are required to apply and maintain valid sales 
and use tax licenses (R.76-82). 
The Decision of the Commission, however, does purport to 
determine that the plaintiffs are ultimate consumers with regard 
to purchases of tangible personal property used in their offices 
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"including office furniture, magazines, dental furniture and equip-
ment and other items for the convenience in the operation of a den-
tal office" (R. 76-82) . Plaintiffs represent that these items were 
not contested before the Tax Commission below and are not disputed 
herein. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the decision of the Tax 
Commission to the extent it purports to hold that "dental supplies 
of gold, etc., and teeth correcting devices, etc.," are consumed 
by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs request in addition that the Court determine 
the additional contested issues of law which were unresolved or 
undisposed of by the Commission below. In the alternative, plain- ' 
tiffs request that the matter be remanded to the Commission for a 
decision on the stipulated issues of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At all times material herein, plaintiffs have been 
and now are licensed to practice dentistry within the State of Utah 
and have conducted the practice of dentistry as that term is de-
fined by Section 58-7-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Plaintiffs have 
never applied for nor received a Utah sales or use tax license at 
any time material herein. Plaintiffs had no sales or use tax 
5 
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exemption or resale certificate at any time material herein (R. 15, 
85) • 
2. Plaintiff Frederick R. Hardy's practice consists of 
general dentistry (R. 15). Plaintiff Erik H. Madsen's practice is 
confined to the specialty of dentistry known as orthodontics and as 
such, this plaintiff straightens, corrects and prevents irregular 
teeth and bones related to the teeth, mouth and jaw (R. 23, 24, 85). 
3. In connection with their professional practice, 
plaintiffs have occasion to order certain services or items from 
dental laboratories, which said services or items are ordered pur-
suant to plaintiffs1 prescription, specifying the type or nature 
of prosthetic restoration required and indicating the metal or 
other material, type of construction, shade, color, mold and/or 
shape required to meet the needs of plaintiffs1 patients. These 
items are itemized on Exhibit A-l of the audit report herein as 
"material transferred to patient" (R. 15, 86). 
4. In addition, plaintiff Erik H. Madsen has occasion 
to purchase certain items which are provided to the patient for 
his educational purposes upon receiving professional services 
from the plaintiff. These items include educational pamphlets 
and toothbrushes (R. 24, 86). 
5. Also, in connection with plaintiffs1 professional 
practice, they have occasion to purchase gold and other dental 
supplies from dental supply houses. When gold is purchased, it 
6 
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is exclusively used by plaintiffs in the practice of their pro-
fession, and the title to said gold is transferred to their pa-
tients as an incident to the rendition of professional services 
(R. 24) . 
6. Attached to plaintiffs' Claims for Refund and by ref-
erence made a part hereof are certain invoices whereby such gold 
has been purchased from Western Dental Supply and Rocky Mountain 
Dental Supply within the State of Utah, with sales tax charged to 
and paid by the plaintiffs (Ex. 3) (R. 28-30). 
7. At various times in plaintiffs' professional prac-
tice, they have occasion to do their own laboratory work, and, 
using material purchased from dental supply houses, they prepare, 
fabricate and provide pursuant to their own diagnosis and pre-
scription, similar types of prosthetic restorations as those re-
ferred to in Paragraph 3 above (R. 16, 32-34). 
8. Title and possession of all of the items mentioned 
heretofore are transferred to plaintiffs' patients (R. 16, 86). 
9. Plaintiffs do not separately itemize laboratory work, 
whether done by themselves or whether ordered by prescription. 
Neither do they itemize and charge separately for gold, fillings 
or other prosthetic devices, regardless of the cost of these items 
to plaintiffs (R. 34, 40-43, 86). 
10. Charges to plaintiffs' patients for the rendition 
of professional services are entirely based on the amount of time 
and the nature of the services performed to correct or prevent the 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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deficiency for which the patients seek the plaintiffs1 services 
(R. 25, 40-42, 86, 87) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS DO NOT PURCHASE AT RETAIL EITHER TANGIBLE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OR SERVICES WITHIN THE SCOPE 
OF THE SALES OR USE TAX ACTS. 
Do plaintiffs' purchases involve retail sales subject 
to the Sales or Use Tax Acts? The question involves the nature of 
the transactions and an understanding of what is purchased. It 
would appear that plaintiffs purchase two different kinds of items. 
The first is services involving a customized, individualized filling 
of a prescription for dentures or other prosthetic devices, all of 
which are passed on by the dentist to his patient. In addition, 
plaintiffs purchase silver, gold, fillings, drugs and other tangi-
ble personal property used by them in professionally diagnosing 
and treating their patients, the actual title and possession of 
which is transferred to the patient as an incident to the rendition 
of professional services. Other items purchased by the plaintiffs 
such as dental equipment for use in the practice of dentistry are 
concededly taxable and are not subject to this appeal. 
The "Emergency Revenue Act of 1933" (Title 59, Ch. 15), 
imposes a tax upon "every retail sale of tangible personal pro-
8 
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perty," (§59-15-4 (a), U.C.A., 1953) (emphasis added) or a tax 
upon "the amount paid or charged for all services for repairs or 
renovations of tangible personal property, or for the installa-
tion of tangible personal property in connection with other tangi-
ble personal property." (§59-15-4 (e), U.C.A., 1953.) 
The Utah use tax, enacted originally as the "Use Tax Act 
of 1937," levies and imposes an excise tax upon the storage, use 
or other consumption in this State of tangible personal property, 
at a rate equivalent to the sales tax from every person storing, 
using or consuming such tangible personal property or otherwise 
contracting for the rendition of taxable services. (§59-16-3, 
U.C.A., 1953.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
It makes no difference whether the purchase transaction 
takes place in or outside of the State of Utah because if the sale 
wherein the dentist acquired such services or materials would not 
have been taxable if occurring within Utah, then it is also not 
subject to a use tax by the State of Utah. See Geneva Steel Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208. 
Thus, the State Tax Commission seeks to impose a tax upon 
the purchase of tangible personal property and other services by 
dentists from suppliers where those dentists retransfer such pro-
perty and services in the course of their professional service occu-
pations. Such purchases in order to be taxable under the Use Tax 
Act must also be subject to sales tax if the sales of property and 
service take place in the State of Utah. 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Both the Sales Tax Act and the Use Tax Act concern them-
selves with the definition of retail or retailer. Section 59-15-2 
(e), U.C.A., 1953, defines "retail sale" to mean: 
Every sale within the State of Utah by a 
retailer or wholesaler to a user or con-
sumer, except sales defined as wholesale 
sales or otherwise exempted by the terms 
of this Act . . . (Emphasis supplied,) 
The same section further defines retailer as: 
A person doing a regularly organized retail 
business in tangible personal property, and 
selling to the user or consumer and not for 
resale . . . (Emphasis supplied.) 
The definition of retailer in the Use Tax Act is not the 
same. Section 59-16-2 (f), U.C.A., 1953, defines that term as "every 
person engaged in the business of making sales of tangible personal 
property for storage, use or other consumption." Section 59-16-2 (b) 
defines "use" to exclude: 
The sale, display, demonstration, or trial 
of . . . property in the regular course of 
business and held for resale. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The Sales Tax Act defines "wholesale sale" as: 
Each purchase of tangible personal property 
or product made by a person engaged in the 
business of manufacturing, compounding for 
sale, profit or use, any article, substance 
or commodity, which enters into and becomes 
an ingredient or component part of the tangi-
ble personal property or product which he 
manufactures or compounds . . . " (See Sec-
tion 59-15-2 (f) .) 
Section 59-15-2(f), U.C.A., 1953, further provides: 
10 
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Each purchase of service as defined in Section 
59-15-4(b) by a person selling a service subject 
to tax under 59-15-4 (b) which is actually used 
in compounding such service is deemed a whole-
sale sale and exempt from tax. 
Accordingly, before the sales or use tax can fall upon 
the transactions herein, the State Tax Commission must show: 
• 1. A sale 
2. of tangible personal property 
3. at retail 
4. by a retailer 
5. to a user or consumer 
6. not for resale. 
What is the legal characterization of the transactions 
in question? Are they retail sales, wholesale sales, sales of ser-
vices incident to tangible personal property, or sales of profes-
sional services? 
It is important to keep in mind that the only sales which 
are subject to the Utah Sales or Use Tax Acts are sales at retail of 
tangible personal property or sales of service for "repairs, reno-
vations, cleaning or washing" other tangible personal property 
to an ultimate user or consumer. Wholesale sales, so-called sales 
of professional services or services other than those enumerated in 
the statute, are not taxable simply because the legislature has not 
chosen to make them so. 
11 
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In the present case, plaintiffs1 purchases of gold and 
dental supplies transferred to their patients are not at retail 
because plaintiffs do not retain title or possession to the items 
purchased and are therefore not the ultimate consumers thereof. See 
Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 
48 P.2d 526. 
POINT II 
NEITHER THE UTAH SALES NOR USE TAX ACTS APPLY TO SALES 
OF SERVICES BY DENTAL LABORATORIES PURSUANT 
TO PRESCRIPTION ORDER FROM DENTISTS. 
The only reference to the imposition of a sales or use 
tax on services is found in Section 59-15-4, U.C.A., 1953, which 
provides for a tax on services for repairs, renovations, cleaning 
or washing of tangible personal property or for installation of 
tangible personal property rendered in connection with other tangi-
ble personal property. A corresponding use tax is imposed by 
Section 59-16-3 (b). 
In addition, Section 59-15-4 (f) and (g) provide for a 
sales tax upon hotel or trailer court accommodations and services 
and laundry and dry cleaning services. No other services are taxed. 
It is well established that a sales tax on retail sales 
of tangible personal property such as the one adopted by the Utah 
Legislature does not apply to the sale of personal, professional 
12 
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or other services unless the Legislature specifically so provides. 
See King v. State Board of Equalization, 99 Cal. Rep. 802, 22 C.A. 
3d 1006; 53 C.J.S. Lie. Section 30(e); State v. Community Blood 
and Plasma Services, Inc., 48 Ala. pp. 658, 267 So.2d 176; Dibble 
v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 U.2d 241, 364 
P.2d 1085. 
In the case of Wray's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Lee, 199 So. 767, 
plaintiffs complained against the State of Florida seeking exemp-
tion from that state's retail sales tax which had been imposed upon 
the practice of compounding medicines from prescriptions of doctors. 
Plaintiffs argued that they were practicing their profession uncon- J 
nected with the sale of general merchandise; that the majority of 
the charges imposed for their services were for professional ser-
vices rather than materials. They urged the court to adopt the 
Illinois rule set forth in Burgess Co. v. Ames, 359 111. 427, 194 
N.E. 565, to the effect that a retail sales tax was not applicable 
where the article sold was a mere incident to the service which 
was required to prepare it. 
The Florida court in response to this argument stated: 
In view of the fact that (Florida law) contains 
its own definition of a "sale", we believe 
such rules are inappropriate to the question 
in this state. 
A sale is defined ... to mean "any trans-
fer, exchange or barter, conditional or other-
wise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, 
of tangible personal property, for a considera-
tion." 
13 
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... the term "gross receipts" is defined to 
mean "the total amount of the sale price of 
the retail sales of retailers, including any 
services that are a part of such sales ..." 
(199 So. 768) 
The Florida court ruled against the pharmacists because 
"the definition of 'gross receipts1, as set forth in the Act, in-
dicates that the Legislature was aware of this problem where service 
is a factor in the sale and specifically provided that it (gross 
receipts) should mean the total sales price, including any services 
that are a part of such sales." 199 So. 768. 
In Illinois, however, where the legislature has not pro-
vided that services are to be included within the Illinois Retailers 
Occupation Tax Act, the courts have reached a different conclusion. 
The case of Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 111. 626, 12 N.E.2d 635, is 
illustrative. There plaintiffs filed a complaint for an injunc-
tion to restrain state officials from levying and collecting a 
state tax upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible 
personal property to purchasers for use or consumption. Plaintiffs 
were optometrists both filling prescriptions and furnishing spec-
tacles, eye glasses, lenses and frames to users and consumers. 
One of the questions before the court was whether the transfer of 
lenses and frames pursuant to prescription or otherwise was a sale 
within the meaning of the Illinois Act. The court stated: 
If it becomes necessary for a physician 
to furnish medicine or surgical dressings 
in effecting a cure, he certainly does not 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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thereby come within the designation of 
those engaged in a calling which would 
result in the imposition of a retail tax. 
The same reasoning applies to dentists. 
... The main object and purpose of opto-
metry is to furnish service to one requiring 
a correction of vision. It is not a craft 
or a trade but a personal professional 
calling .... The requirements of the statute 
in regard to this particular calling insist 
upon a good moral character on the part of 
the applicant, graduation from an approved 
school of optometry, and the passing of 
satisfactory examinations and tests as to 
educational fitness. None of these re-
quisites are necessary for one engaged in 
the business of retail sale of tangibles. 
The lenses furnished are the result of 
skilled mechanical grinding and prepara-
tion. The ocular examination of the re-
cipient of the service demands a high de-
gree of skill. These things are the main 
objectives. While it is true that frames 
are furnished and their price considered 
in the ultimate attainment of the purpose, 
it is purely incidental to the main objects 
sought to be accomplished... The furnishing 
of new frames does not alter the character 
of the calling or convert a profession into 
a trade. (12 N.E.2d 637) 
The court concluded that the transfer of lenses and frames 
by an optometrist incident to the rendition of professional services 
was not a retail sale. See also J.A. Burgess Co. v. Ames, 359 111. 
427, 194 N.E. 565; Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Department of 
Revenue, 405 111. 367, 90 N.E.2d 747; American Brake Shoe Co. v. 
Department of Revenue, 25 111.2d 354, 185 N.E. 2d 192. 
Similarly, in the case of Ahern v. Nudelman, 374 111. 237, 
29 N.E.2d 268, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the petition 
of a funeral director who contended that he did not make retail sales 
but rather that the entire cost of the funeral consisted of a service. 
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The court quoted the Illinois statute defining a sale at 
retail to mean "any transfer or the ownership of, or title to, 
tangible personal property to the purchaser, for use or consumption 
and not for resale in any form as tangible personal property, for a 
valuable consideration." The court then stated that if the thing 
sold constituted personal, professional or other service and not 
tangible property that the statute did not apply. The court in up-
holding the tax against the funeral director distinguished the cases 
previously cited and stated: 
Appellants cite those cases where it has 
been held the transaction involved profes-
sional service or skill in which the trans-
fer of tangible personal property was merely 
incidental, such as lenses and frames fur-
nished by an optometrist (Babcock v. Nudelman, 
supra, ... Commercial Photography and Photo-
static Service) Burgess Co. v. Ames, supra, * . 
... These cases do not control. The dis-
tinction is apparent. In the cases just 
cited it was the skill or service that was 
bargained for and the property incidentally 
delivered had a value only as a result of 
such skill or service. There was no fixed 
or ascertainable relation between the value 
of the skill and the property to which the 
skill was applied to make it serviceable... 
(29 N.E.2d 269) 
So in the present case the property purchased by plaintiffs 
from dental laboratories has value only as a result of the skill or 
service rendered by such laboratories pursuant to the prescription 
of the plaintiffs. The property delivered has value only as a result 
of such skill and has value only to the plaintiffs and their patients 
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and does not constitute, therefore, a sale of tangible personal pro-
perty but rather a sale of service. 
• Plaintiffs submit that Utah has essentially adopted the 
Illinois Rule to the effect that where a sale combines both elements 
of service and of tangible personal property, that where the personal 
property is merely incidental to the rendition of services, and that 
where the thing contracted for and the principal values involved are 
represented by services, the sale in question is not a retail sale. 
C. F. Young Electric Sign Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 4 U.2d 
242, 291 P.2d 900; McKendrick v. State Tax Commission, 9 U.2d 418, 
347 P.2d 177. 
For this reason custom services ordered from dental lab-
oratories do not involve retail sales of tangible personal property 
when they are purchased by plaintiffs pursuant to prescription where-
by plaintiffs specify and their suppliers render services incident 
to the custom creation of prosthetic devices the value of which is 
nominal in comparison with the total price of the contracted labora-
tory service. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS DO NOT STORE, USE OR CONSUME TANGIBLE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OR SERVICES PURCHASED FROM 
DENTAL LABORATORIES OR SUPPLY HOUSES. 
As the Utah Sales and Use Tax Acts are presently consti-
tuted, a sales transaction in this State is not taxable unless tan-
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gible personal property is transferred (1) "for use or consumption/1 
and (2) "not for resale." 
These terms are not defined by statute and the State Tax 
Commission has no authority to define them by regulation. Regard-
less of whether the transactions herein are held to represent sales 
of -tangible personal property at retail by a retailer to the plain-
tiff s, plaintiffs are not the users or consumers of the property so 
purchased, and the property so sold is retransferred in its entirety 
to plaintiffs' patients. Plaintiffs submit that they are not the 
users or consumers of tangible personal property passed on in many 
cases to their patients in the identical form in which such property 
was received. 
The case of Berry-Kofron Dental Laboratory Co. v. Smith, 
Mo. , 137 S.W.2d 452, is extremely instructive in this regard. 
There a dental laboratory company manufacturing dentures exclusively 
for dentists who furnished it prescriptions and impressions of the 
mouths of their patients was held not to be engaged in the business 
of selling tangible personal property at retail to a user or con-
sumer, and therefore not subject to the sales tax. 
The Missouri Supreme Court, indicating that taxing stat-
utes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer, proceeded to 
define the terms "user" and "consumer". It stated: 
The user or consumer contemplated by the 
statute is the ultimate user or consumer 
who will use the articles as long as they 
last or until he desires to do away with 
them. 
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The Court then proceeded by way of dictum to consider the question 
of whether the dentist was the user or consumer of dentures and 
other dental supplies. The Court concluded: 
If the transaction between plaintiff and 
the dentist be regarded as a sale of the 
manufactured denture by the former to the 
latter, rather than the rendition of skilled 
service with the value of the materials used 
only incidental, we think nevertheless it is 
not subject to the sales tax. The tax is im-
posed upon sales for use or consumption. This 
means use or consumption by the purchaser. 
Respondents argue that the dentist uses or 
"consumes" the denture by placing it in his 
patient's mouth in the rendition of professional 
service to the patient. We think this conten-
tion untenable. The dentist orders the denture 
for his patient. The patient for whom it is pro-
cured and to whom the dentist transfers it is the 
person who uses it, by applying it to the pur-
poses for which it is intended and who, we think, 
must be regarded as the consumer. Whether or not 
the transaction between dentist and patient where-
by the former transfers the denture to the latter 
is taxable is a question not before us . . ." 
(p. 456) (Emphasis supplied.) 
So in the present case the question of whether the trans-
action between the dentist and his patient is taxable was not be-
fore the Tax Commission and is not before this Court. The question 
before this body at this time is whether the dentist uses or con-
sumes tangible personal property acquired from supply houses or den-
tal laboratories. It is respectfully submitted that plaintiffs do 
not use or consume these items so as to be subject to the tax in 
question. 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS DO NOT STORE, USE OR CONSUME 
TANGIBLE PROPERTY FABRICATED BY THEMSELVES AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSFERRED TO THEIR PATIENTS. 
All service occupations are not subject to the Utah Re-
tail Sales or Use Tax rather only such service occupations as are 
incident to the repair or renovation of tangible personal property 
or for installation of tangible personal property rendered in con-
nection with other tangible personal property. Plaintiffs submit 
that the installation of dentures in the course of the professional 
practice of dentistry wherein they compound their own prosthetic 
devices, is not the rendition of service incident to the repair or 
renovation of tangible personal property. 
It is further submitted that plaintiffs are not the ulti-
mate consumers under the Utah Sales or Use Tax Acts of devices which 
they fabricate themselves. To be taxable as such, the sale to them 
cannot be one for resale. If the fabrication of dentures and pros-
thetic devices by dentists themselves is not considered to be a pro-
fessional service, then the only possible thing it can be under 
the statute is a purchase of tangible personal property made by a 
person engaged in manufacturing or compounding for sale under the 
provisions of Section 59-15-2(f), which said purchase is exempt 
from sales tax by statute as constituting a wholesale sale. 
The case of American Optical Co. v. Nudelman, 370 111. 
627, 19 N.E.2d 582, contains dictum which is pertinent to the reso-
lution of this controversy. There the State of Illinois levied a 
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retail sales tax upon persons engaged in the business of selling 
tangible personal property for use and consumption and not for re-
sale. The State attempted to levy the tax upon wholesale opticians 
manufacturing and delivering optical supplies upon prescriptions 
and orders from optometrists and occulists. The court there said: 
The sales made by plaintiff wholesalers are 
clearly not sales "for use and consumption" 
by the optometrists and occulists who purchase 
them. In Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 111. 180, 
18 N.E.2d 219, where wholesalers of rubber 
heals and leather were involved [a case very 
similar to Western Leather and Finding Co., su-
pra] , we had occasion to consider the meaning of 
those terms. We found "consumption" to mean 
the use of economic goods resulting in the 
dimunition or destruction of their utility. 
At the same time we said "use" as employed in 
the statute means long continued possession 
and employment of a thing to the purpose for 
which it is adapted, as distinguished from a 
possession that is merely temporary or occa-
sional. Optometrists and occulists neither 
use nor consume eye glasses and other optical 
supplies within the meaning of these definitions. 
As an incident of their services, they merely 
furnish such articles to their patients in the 
same form in which they are supplied by the whole-
sale opticians. The optical supply houses are in 
the same position as plumbing supply houses and 
wholesale houses supplying leather soles and rub-
ber heals to shoe repairers . . . In both these 
cases we held that the wholesalers were not making 
transfers for use or consumption, and that their 
businesses were not subject to the occupation tax. 
The fact that eye glasses and other optical sup-
plies handled by optometrists and occulists will 
not be taxed at all unless we hold wholesale op-
ticians liable is of no significance. I ~. ] To 
hold one party is liable to a tax because another 
party is not liable would be an anomaly in the law. 
(p. 583) 
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While not directly in point, the case of Dibble v. Dr. 
W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 U.2d 241, 364 P.2d 
1085, illustrates that what would normally constitute a sale if 
rendered incident to the rendition of professional services is not 
a sale. In that case plaintiff contended that the furnishing of 
blood by a hospital at the request of the patient for a fee consti-
tuted a sale of tangible personal property subject to warranties 
of fitness for use. Without regard to the relative value of the 
tangible property transferred as compared with the total charge for 
service, the court held that the furnishing of blood by a hospital 
at the request of a patient or his doctor for a charge is a part 
of a professional service and not a sale. 
POINT V 
THE DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENTS HEREIN DO NOT OPERATE 
UNIFORMLY AND EQUALLY AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Under the deficiency assessments as proposed, if plaintiffs 
personally perform the laboratory work necessary to treat their pa-
tients, such services are not taxable. If plaintiffs contract the 
same identical services with a dental laboratory, they are charged 
sales or use taxes on the total purchase price of the laboratory 
service or prosthetic device ordered pursuant to their prescription. 
Article XIII, Section.3, of the Utah Constitution mandates 
an equal and uniform application of tax laws in this state as they 
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affect tangible personal property. A tax law which fails to secure 
equality and impartiality of the tax authorized is void. Kerr v. 
Woolley, 3 Utah 456, 24 P. 831. 
While there is authority for the proposition that the sales 
tax, as a transactional tax, is not within the mandate of Article. 
XIII, Section 3, where there is a reasonable legislative classifi-
cation of the transactions subject to taxation, see e.g. W. F. Jensen 
Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 61 P.2d 629, the re-
quirement is clear that the tax must be equal and uniform as it ap-
plies to the same activity. Equality in the burden of taxation is 
fundamental; and in seeking to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature, the Court will adopt that interpretation of the taxing 
statute which lays the burden uniformly on all standing in the same 
degree with relation to the tax adopted. Norville v. State Tax Com-
mission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937. 
Here, if plaintiffs contract for laboratory services in-
cidental to their professional practices, the Tax Commission, by 
its audit deficiencies, has considered them to be "consumers" and 
therefore subject to the sales or use taxes applicable to the trans-
actions in question. However, where the same services are performed 
in the taxpayer's own offices, and the plaintiffs stand in the shoes 
of the dental laboratory with respect to the rendition of identical 
services, all of which are for the ultimate benefit of plaintiffs1 
patients, the Tax Commission still considers plaintiffs to be "con-
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sumers11. This curious result illustrates more forcibly than ever 
the fact that plaintiffs are not the real consumers at all of the 
materials or services ordered, prescribed, compounded or fabricated 
for their patients. To hold that they are is merely an exercise 
in administrative expediency by the Tax Commission; and as such, 
constitutes an illegal and discriminatory application of the Sales 
and Use Tax Acts to plaintiffs which this Court should not allow. 
POINT VI 
THE REGULATIONS UPON WHICH THE DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENTS 
HEREIN ARE PREDICATED ARE VOID FOR INDEFINITENESS. 
It has been pointed out that wholesale sales, sales of 
professional services or sales of services other than those enumer-
ated in the statute are not taxable under current Utah statutes. 
The legislature has not provided any guidelines in a determination 
of which sales of services are incident to repairs, renovations, 
cleaning or washing of tangible personal property to an ultimate 
user or consumer. 
The case of Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State 
Tax Commission of Utah, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526, is pertinent. 
Plaintiff there was a Utah corporation engaged in the sale of 
leather and shoe findings either for resale or for use in the re-
pair of old or used shoes. The State Tax Commission asserted that 
plaintiff was liable for the payment of sales tax on materials sold 
to shoe repairers. It was conceded that plaintiff was engaged in 
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a wholesale business unless shoe repairers were considered to be 
consumers of materials used in the mending and repairing of shoes. 
The taxpayer contended that the Sales Tax Act did not 
vest in the Tax Commission any right to require the payment of a 
sales tax by anyone other than those designated by the Act, and 
that by failing to define the terms upon which the tax was based, 
the legislature had abdicated or transferred to the Tax Commission 
legislative functions. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The legislature is not permitted to abdicate 
or transfer to others the essential legisla-
tive function with which it is thus vested. 
The imposition of a tax and the designation 
of those who must pay the same is such an 
essential legislative function as may not be 
transferred to others. (p. 231) 
So in the present case, if the Tax Commission is attempt-
ing to impose a sales or use tax upon the rendition of professional 
services without the authority of the legislature, and if such a 
determination is necessary in order to sustain the audit deficiencies 
herein, plaintiffs submit that the Tax Commission's determinations 
in this regard are beyond the scope of its authority and are there-
fore void and unconstitutional. 
With regard to where to draw the line between a lawful 
delegation of the right to interpret an Act, Mr. Justice Wolfe in 
the concurring opinion in Western Leather and Finding Co., supra, 
stated: 
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The Commission is entitled to promulgate 
rules and regulations for the practical and 
proper administration of the Act. Such can-
not be against the teeth of the law. They 
can serve to fill up the details as long as 
they do not run counter to the express will 
of the legislature. . . . (p. 235) 
Concerning himself with the practical implications of the 
question there at hand and which is now before this Court, Mr. 
Justice Wolfe stated: 
Theoretically and perhaps logically, those 
service industries may effect a sale to the 
patron of tangible articles which they use 
in connection with their services. If so, 
the value of the articles sold and contributed 
in connection with the services are so inciden-
tal and so proportionately small as compared 
to the value of the services that for practi-
cal reasons they cannot be considered a sale. 
On the other hand, where the article is sold 
and the servicing of the same incidental to . 
the sale is such a small part of the price of 
the whole, such value of the services cannot 
be subtracted from the sale price. Where to 
draw the line is questionable. . . . All 
along the line from the production of raw ma-
terials to the finished product, the fabrica-
tion of goods entails the working in of ma-
terials which cannot be said to be used or 
consumed until they reach the person who is 
actually using, consuming or wearing the to-
tally assembled article. The sales tax ap-
plies to the sale of the end product; not 
only to the sale of the end product, but to 
the sale of the end product at retail, 
(pp. 236-237) 
The court reversed the order of the Tax Commission con-
cluding that the services rendered incident to the sale of repair 
materials were not taxable and that the person to whom such mater-
ials were sold was not the consumer. 
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In order for the tax to apply to the purchase transac-
tions wherein plaintiffs acquired materials from their suppliers, 
plaintiffs must be construed to be users or consumers of tangible 
personal property which they retransfer to their patients. Plain-
tiffs submit that the Tax Commission Regulations are void for in-
definiteness where all use or consumption is not taxable and no 
definition is provided by statute or regulation concerning which 
use or consumption is taxable and which is not. See 50 Am.Jur., 
Statutes, §472, p. 485. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, plaintiffs submit that the sales trans-
actions wherein they acquired title to tangible personal property 
or ordered services are not such retail transactions as to come 
within the scope of the law. Plaintiffs further contend that they 
do not store, use or consume items transferred to their patients 
and that regulations of the Tax Commission or interpretations of 
its Auditing Department to the contrary are illegal. Plaintiffs 
further submit that the tax consequences to them should be the same 
regardless of whether prescription services for prosthetic devices 
are ordered from others or furnished by themselves. Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit that the only way to achieve this result is to 
find that they are exempt from the Utah Sales and Use Tax Acts with 
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respect to materials and services which they acquire for transfer 
and ultimate consumption by their patients. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & HOWARD 
F. Burton Howard 
1000 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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